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ABSTRACT
Demand response is crucial for the incorporation of renew-
able energy into the grid. In this paper, we focus on a par-
ticularly promising industry for demand response: data cen-
ters. We use simulations to show that, not only are data cen-
ters large loads, but they can provide as much (or possibly
more) flexibility as large-scale storage if given the proper
incentives. However, due to the market power most data
centers maintain, it is difficult to design programs that are
efficient for data center demand response. To that end, we
propose that prediction-based pricing is an appealing market
design, and show that it outperforms more traditional sup-
ply function bidding mechanisms in situations where market
power is an issue. However, prediction-based pricing may be
inefficient when predictions are inaccurate, and so we pro-
vide analytic, worst-case bounds on the impact of prediction
error on the efficiency of prediction-based pricing. These
bounds hold even when network constraints are considered,
and highlight that prediction-based pricing is surprisingly
robust to prediction error.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
J.2 [Computer Applications]: Physical sciences and en-
gineering
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
Demand response is widely recognized as a crucial tool
for incorporating renewables into the grid, e.g., see recent
reports from the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST) and the Department of Energy (DoE) [13,42].
Demand response programs provide incentives for customers
to adapt their electricity demand to supply availability, for
example, reducing their consumption in response to a peak
load warning signal or request from the utility. Thus, de-
mand response programs can help the grid transition from
the paradigm of “generation follows demand” to one where,
at least partially, “demand follows generation.” Such a tran-
sition is fundamental to the integration of renewable energy
because generation is becoming more intermittent and less
controllable as renewable penetration increases.
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In this paper, we consider a promising demand response
resource: data centers. Data centers are particularly well-
suited for demand response. First, data centers represent
large loads for the grid. In 2011, they consumed approxi-
mately 1.5% of all electricity worldwide and individual data
centers can be 50 MW, or more [1, 20, 43]. Further, the
energy consumption of data centers is growing quickly, by
approximately 10-12% per year [1, 20, 30]. This growth is
crucial for keeping pace with the growth of renewable adop-
tion predicted for the coming years. Third, and most im-
portantly, data centers are extremely flexible loads. Data
centers are highly automated and monitored, e.g., the power
load and state of IT equipment and cooling facilities can be
continuously monitored and panoramically adjusted. For ex-
ample, a recent empirical study by LBNL has quantified the
flexibility in power usage of four data centers under differ-
ent management approaches [20]. They find that 5% of the
load can typically be shed in 5 minutes and 10% of the load
can be shed in 15 minutes; and that these can be achieved
without changes to how the IT workload is handled, i.e., via
temperature adjustment and other building management ap-
proaches. Further, if workload management approaches are
considered, the degree of flexibility can be larger, without
additional time needed to shed the load. Significant research
has recently gone into the design of such workload manage-
ment, e.g., [10,18,21,34,39,49,52,53].
Data center demand response today. Despite wide recog-
nition of the demand response potential of data centers, the
current reality is that data centers perform little, if any, de-
mand response [20,43].
In particular, the most common demand response pro-
gram available for data centers is Coincident Peak Pricing
(CPP), which is required for medium and large industrial
consumers in many regions. These programs work by charg-
ing a very high price for usage during the coincident peak
hour, often over 200 times higher than the base rate.1 It
is common for the coincident peak charges to account for
23% or more of a customer’s electric bill according to Fort
Collins Utilities [48]. Hence, a customer has a strong in-
centive to reduce usage during the peak hour. Although it
is impossible to accurately predict exactly when the peak
hour will occur, many utilities identify potential peak hours
and send warning signals to customers (5-10 per month),
which helps customers manage their loads and make deci-
sions about their energy usage. For more details about CPP
see [48].
Unfortunately, CPP programs are poorly designed from
the perspective of data center demand response. Not pro-
viding response may incur a very large charge and providing
a response may not actually result in any savings if the coin-
cident peak does not occur during the warning period. As a
1The coincident peak hour is defined as the hour when the
most electricity is demanded from the load serving entity
(LSE).
result, even when they are forced to participate in such pro-
grams, data centers tend not to actively respond to signals.
Further, even if they do respond, such programs extract very
little flexibility from data centers. At best they obtain cur-
tailment of usage a few times per month. This wastes the
potential responsiveness of data centers.
Demand response market design. Although researchers
have begun to focus on new market designs for data cen-
ter demand response, e.g., [20, 28, 45, 46, 48], a clear vision
remains elusive.
This is also true outside of the domain of data centers.
Recently, the design of demand response programs has re-
ceived considerable attention in a variety of settings, e.g.,
electric vehicles, pool pumps, and air conditioner cycling.
Broadly speaking, the demand response programs that have
emerged can be classified into two categories based on the
interaction with users: either (i) users bid some degree of
flexibility (supply) into the market, usually via a parame-
terized supply function, or (ii) users respond to a posted
price, which was chosen using predictions about the avail-
able flexibility (e.g., supply functions). We term these ap-
proaches “supply function bidding” and “prediction-based
pricing”, respectively. Examples of proposed designs that
use supply function bidding include [29, 50], and examples
of prediction-based pricing designs include [12,32,40].
While each of these design approaches has pluses and mi-
nuses (as we discuss in Section 3), our focus on data centers
motivates us to focus on prediction-based pricing programs.
In particular, a key assumption in the design and analy-
sis of supply function bidding demand response programs is
that users are price takers, i.e., they do not anticipate their
impact on the price. Under this assumption, such designs
can minimize the aggregate user cost while achieving the
desired curtailment of demand. However, if this assump-
tion is violated, and users act strategically, then inefficiency
emerges in the market. Data centers are a canonical exam-
ple of a user with market power – data centers can make up
50% of the load of the distribution circuits they are on, e.g.,
Facebook’s data center in Crook County, Oregon. Thus, it
is dangerous to treat them as price takers.
In contrast, prediction-based pricing is not nearly as im-
pacted by market power issues. It is, however, highly depen-
dent on the accuracy of the predictions of the user response
to prices. Thus, there are still significant challenges in the
design of such programs, and these issues are the focus of
this paper.
Contributions of this paper. This paper makes two main
contributions: (i) it quantifies the potential of data cen-
ter demand response through a comparison with large-scale
storage, and (ii) it presents and analyzes a novel design for
prediction-based pricing of data center demand response.
We discuss each of these in more detail in the following.
The potential of data center demand response: To
quantify the potential of data center demand response we
perform numerical case studies that compare the value of
the flexibility provided by data centers with that provided by
large-scale storage. In particular, in Section 2, we ask: How
much (optimally placed) storage can a data center replace?
Interestingly, our results highlight that the flexibility pro-
vided by data centers is as valuable as, and often more
valuable than, the flexibility provided by large-scale stor-
age when it comes to ensuring that a distribution network
meets its voltage constraints in the presence of a large-scale
solar (PV) installation (see Figures 6). For example, the
voltage violation frequency that comes from using a 30MW
data center, which can provide 20% flexibility, is roughly
equivalent to that of 1MWh of optimally-placed storage in
the 46 bus distribution network from Southern California
Edison that we consider. This is a quite conservative com-
parison because we assume storage with infinite charging
speed (see Figure 5 for the impact of the charging rate).
Further, the benefit of data center flexibility is robust to
the placement within the distribution network – there are
very few locations where the effectiveness of the data center
drops considerably (see Figure 7).
Additionally, we look at the impact of a growing dichotomy
in how IT companies address the sustainability of their data
centers. Some companies, e.g., Apple [24], have invested
heavily in on-site renewable generation; while others, e.g.,
Google [25], have tended to invest in renewable generation
that is not co-located with their data centers. Both ap-
proaches have merits. Providing renewable generation on-
site ensures that it is available where a very large and flexi-
ble load is located, but if renewable generation is not placed
on site it can be placed in locations with better generation
quality and/or cheaper installation costs.
Interestingly, our case studies highlight that co-location of
data centers and large-scale PV installations is very efficient.
In particular, the voltage violation frequency when the data
center is placed at the same bus as the PV in a distribution
network is within 4% of optimal. However, it is worth noting
that a data center with local PV is not nearly as efficient
at helping manage a large-scale PV installation as a data
center without local PV. In particular, a 20MW data center
with 20% flexibility and a co-located 5MW solar installation
provides the same voltage violation frequency as 0.3MWh of
optimally-placed storage, i.e., 25% less than a 20MW data
center with no local PV. Thus, having PV at the location of
the data center is better than having it elsewhere, due to the
complementary diurnal patterns of each, but a data center
without local renewables is a more valuable resource for grid
management than a data center with local renewables.
Prediction-based pricing: Given the potential of data
center demand response identified in the first half of the
paper, the second half of the paper focuses on designing a
demand response program that can extract this flexibility.
As we have already discussed, prediction-based pricing is an
appealing candidate given the market power data centers
maintain. Thus, in Sections 4 and 5 we present and analyze
a design for prediction-based pricing. Section 4 introduces
the design in a context without the constraints imposed by
the distribution network, and then Section 5 incorporates
the network constraints into the design and analysis.
The analysis in these sections is focused on three issues.
First, we focus on the impact of the accuracy of predictions
on the efficiency of the market design. This is, perhaps,
the most crucial issue for prediction-based pricing programs.
Our results provide an analytic characterization of worst-
case efficiency bounds under the assumption of quadratic
objective functions (Theorem 2), which is a common as-
sumption in the power system literature. In particular, we
derive tight bounds on the competitive ratio of prediction-
based pricing that highlight the impact of the variability of
the prediction error.
The second issue is the contrast between prediction-based
pricing and supply function bidding. As we have mentioned,
prediction error hurts the former while market power hurts
the latter. Thus, the natural question becomes: Under
which settings is prediction-based pricing appropriate? By
contrasting our results with those of [50] on the efficiency
of supply function bidding, we give an explicit characteriza-
tion in terms of market power and prediction error of when
prediction-based pricing outperforms supply function bid-
ding (Figure 10). Broadly speaking, the comparison high-
lights that prediction-based pricing is appropriate for data
center demand response when prediction errors are moder-
ate and the data center has significant, local market power.
Finally, the third issue our analysis focuses on is the im-
pact of network constraints on the design and efficiency of
prediction-based pricing. In our analysis, the network con-
straints manifest themselves as a chance constraint on the
price that ensures that voltage violations in the network are
rare. But, despite constraints on the prices, we prove that
the efficiency of prediction-based pricing is not impacted by
the network constraints, i.e., the competitive ratio remains
unchanged (Theorem 5). This represents the first analytic
bound on the efficiency of prediction-based pricing in the
presence of network constraints.
2. QUANTIFYING THE POTENTIAL OF
DATA CENTER DEMAND RESPONSE
Before looking at the design of market programs to extract
flexibility from data centers, it is crucial to quantify the
potential of such programs. In this section, we accomplish
this by contrasting the flexibility provided by data centers
with that provided by large-scale storage.
Often, when people think of the challenges for grid man-
agement that result from renewable energy, the thought is:
“if only we had large-scale storage...” The problem is that
large-scale storage is expensive, which leads to the consid-
eration of demand response. But, besides cost, demand re-
sponse also has other benefits over storage. In particular,
storage needs to be pre-charged to be ready for use, while
demand response has no such requirement. However, stor-
age has benefits as well. First, the placement of storage is
more flexible than that of data centers. Second, apart from
pre-charging, storage does not bring with it any electricity
demand, whereas data center demand response inherently
requires the presence of a large load in the distribution net-
work.
In the experiments that follow, we study the impact of
these competing factors in order to understand how the po-
tential of data center demand response compares to large-
scale storage. In particular, we ask: How much (optimally
placed) storage can a data center replace? Since we focus on
bounding the potential of data center demand response in
this section, we do not model market factors. Rather, we as-
sume that the load serving entity (LSE) can call on the data
center and storage as needed. Market design is considered
in the second half of the paper.
2.1 Setup
To quantify the potential of data center demand response,
we study a situation where a distribution network has a
large-scale solar installation and either large-scale storage
or a data center to help manage the intermittency of the
solar installation.
The performance objective we consider is that of minimiz-
ing the frequency of violations of voltage constraints in the
distribution network. To measure this frequency we sum
the number of buses with voltage violations at each time
slot and over time, i.e., the number of buses that result in
voltages outside the tolerance bounds given by the network.
For instance, a violation frequency 0.1 means on average,
each bus experiences voltage violation in 10% of the time.
We contrast the frequency of voltage violations when a data
center is present and when large-scale storage is present.
Distribution network. We consider two distribution net-
works in our experiments. Both are distribution networks
from the Southern California Edison (SCE) utility company.
The first is a 47 bus network (Figure 1) and the second is
a 56 bus network (Figure 2). Both are described in detail
in [15].
There is no conventional generation on these distribution
networks. All power comes from the substation bus, a.k.a.,
the zero bus, and the solar installation (which we describe
later). The demands are taken from SCE load profiles [23],
except for the data center, for which the demand is described
later.
Given these settings, a significant amount of the solar gen-
eration can be transmitted out of the distribution network
through the substation bus. However, because we consider a
large-scale solar installation, when the installation has near
Figure 1: SCE 47 bus network.
Figure 2: SCE 56 bus network.
peak generation, the network constraints become binding
and voltage violations are common. Note that the voltage
constraint we consider is taken directly from the network
tolerance specifications, and is 3%. The number of viola-
tions in our simulations are consistent with previous work
on these networks, e.g., [14, 15]. The presence of storage or
the data center is used to help avoid such violations.
For our simulations, given the network, the power flow is
computed for a sequence of discrete time steps t = 1, . . . , T
using MatPower [54]. Then, we analyze the voltages for each
time step and determine the number of buses that have volt-
age violations. Finally, we sum the voltage violation events
from all buses over all time steps, and use it to calculate the
violation frequency. The length of the time steps that we
consider is one minute.
Renewable energy. To model a solar installation placed
within a distribution network, we use solar irradiance data
from Los Angeles, CA in February 2012 [26] to alter the
power load at the bus where the solar (PV) generation is
located. Thus, irradiance data acts like an installed solar
capacity. The trace is illustrated in Figure 3(a).
For the experiments reported, the PV is placed at bus 45
and sized at 30MW for the 47 bus network, and also placed
at bus 45 but sized at 6MW for the 56 bus network2. The
results do not qualitatively change when other locations and
sizes are considered.
Data center model. To incorporate a data center into the
experiments, we need to model two aspects: the power usage
of the data center over time and the flexibility in the power
usage of the data center.
To model the power usage of a data center, we adopt the
model used in [3, 33, 34, 38], which provides a simple but
representative characterization. In particular, we model the
power demand of the data center as a function of the work-
load, including interactive (inflexible) and delay-tolerant (flex-
ible) workloads, and the cooling efficiency, as measured by
the Power Usage Effectiveness (PUE).
To model the workload we use two traces. The interac-
tive workload trace is from a popular web service application
with more than 85 million registered users in 22 countries
2We use different size of PV because the capacities of these
two networks are different.
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Figure 3: One week traces for (a) PV generation,
(b) inflexible workload, (c) flexible workload, and
(d) cooling efficiency.
(see Figure 3(b)). The trace contains average CPU utiliza-
tion and memory usage as recorded every 5 minutes. The
peak-to-mean ratio of the interactive workload is about 4.
The delay-tolerant workload information comes from a Face-
book Hadoop trace (see Figure 3(c)). The total demand ra-
tio between the interactive workload and batch jobs is 1:1.
This ratio can vary widely across data centers, but we choose
this ratio as representative based on discussions in [35].
To model the data center power efficiency including cool-
ing efficiency, we use a trace of the PUE from Google data
centers. As shown in the figure, the PUE varies between 1.05
to 1.45, and has strong diurnal pattern, i.e., higher around
noon because outside air temperature is higher.
To combine the workload traces and the PUE to obtain a
model of the total power demand of the data center, we use
the following relationship.
v(t) = PUE(t)(a(t) + b(t)),
where a(t) is the power demand from the inflexible work-
load and b(t) is power demand from the flexible workload
demand. Note that the data center power demand has the
same average value as the PV generation with the same ca-
pacity in the distribution network.
The second aspect of the data center model that we must
include is the flexibility of the power demand. For this, our
model is informed by the recent empirical study [20], which
we have discussed in the introduction.
To model the range of flexibility in our experiments, we
denote the demand flexibility of the data center by e and
allow the data center to have demand within
[(1− e)v(t),min{(1 + e)v(t), Cd}],
where Cd is the capacity of the data center and v(t) is the
data center power demand at time t if no demand response is
called upon. Thus, e = 0.10 could be achieved without work-
load management, and e = 0.20 can be achieved with some
workload management, e.g., quality degradation or load de-
ferral. When demand response is required from the data
center, the load that minimizes the voltage violation rate is
provided by the data center.
Since a downside of data center demand response is that
the LSE cannot control the placement of the data center,
the placement of the data center is varied during our ex-
periments in order to understand robustness to “bad” data
center locations. Note that we assume there is no cost as-
sociated with the demand shaping of data center; however
the cost of this could be incorporated easily if desired.
Storage model. To incorporate large-scale storage into our
model, we adopt a standard model, e.g., from [19,27,31,47].
In order to provide a conservative estimate of the potential of
data center demand response we assume perfect storage, i.e.,
no loss or leakage. This means that, at all times t, the stor-
age level for the next time step is L(t+1) = L(t)+u(t), where
u(t) is the energy change in the level at time t. Note that
u(t) is positive if we are charging the storage and negative if
we are discharging. Of course, L(t) ∈ [0, Cs] for all t, where
Cs is the storage capacity. So, u(t) ∈ [−L(t), Cs − L(t)],
where Cs is the storage capacity. This range quantifies the
amount of flexibility that can be called upon by the LSE. As
in the case of the data center, the LSE will call upon a fea-
sible u(t) that minimizes the voltage violations. Although
more advanced energy storage management policy could be
used to further improve the benefit, here we use this simple
greedy strategy for both data center and energy storage for
comparisons.
For most of the experiments we assume that the storage
can completely charge and discharge in one time step. This
is, of course, unrealistic, but it allows us to give a conserva-
tive estimate of the benefits of data center demand response.
We do evaluate the impact of limitations on the charging
rate in Figure 5 in order to highlight the degree to which
this assumption leads to an underestimate of the value of
data center demand response.
As we have already mentioned, a benefit of storage is that
it can be placed optimally within a network. The optimal
placement of the storage is at bus 44 for the 47 bus network
and bus 53 for the 56 bus network. Note that the optimal
placement is robust as we adjust the capacity of the storage
in our experiments.
2.2 Case studies
Using the setting described above, our focus is on two
comparisons that each sheds light on the potential of data
center demand response: (i) a comparison between data cen-
ter demand response and large-scale storage, and (ii) a study
of the impact of on-site renewable generation on data center
demand response.
Data center demand response versus large-scale stor-
age. To contrast large-scale storage with data center de-
mand response, we first need to quantify the benefits from
large-scale storage. This is done in Figures 4 and 5, which
show the impacts of the storage capacity and the storage
charging rate on the voltage violation rate in the two distri-
bution networks. Figure 4 highlights that, as expected, the
voltage violation rate decreases as storage capacity grows.
However, it also shows that this relationship is nonlinear
and depends strongly on the network structure. Similarly,
Figure 5 highlights that, as expected, a smaller charging
rate increases the frequency of voltage violations. However,
the impact of a smaller charging rate is, perhaps, more sig-
nificant than expected. Note that for our experiments we
conservatively estimate the value of data center demand re-
sponse by comparing it with storage having a charging rate
of 1, i.e., we assume that the storage can completely charge
and discharge in one minute. This is unrealistic, but pro-
vides a lower bound on the value of data center demand
response.
Given the characterization of storage, we can now high-
light the value of data center demand response in terms of
the “equivalent” storage capacity, i.e., in terms of the ca-
pacity of optimally-placed large-scale storage necessary to
provide the same voltage violation frequency. The results of
this comparison are shown in Figure 6.
Naturally, the amount of storage equivalent to data cen-
ter demand response grows with the size of the data center.
However, the capacity plateaus after the data center size
grows beyond 35MW for the SCE 47 bus network and be-
yond 6MW for the SCE 56 bus network. Note that this
is a consequence of two differences between the networks –
the structure and the size of the PV installation (30MW vs.
6MW).
But, in both networks, Figure 6 highlights that data center
demand response has a significant potential. In particular,
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Figure 4: Impact of energy storage capacity, Cs, on
the voltage violation rates.
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Figure 5: Impact of energy storage charging rate on
the voltage violation rates.
recall that the comparison in this plot assumes storage with
infinite charging speed, i.e., a charging rate of 1, and is thus
quite conservative (as illustrated in Figure 5). Additionally,
the cost of storage is upwards of $500/kWh for lithium-ion
batteries (which have small charging rates) and upwards of
$5000/kWh for technologies with fast charging rates, such as
flywheels. Thus, the flexibility provided by one 30MW data
center is worth upwards of $500,000 - $5,000,000. These
numbers are conservative estimates, and grow considerably
if a slower charging rate is used in the simulations or if the
flexibility of the data center, e, is increased.
Figures 7 and 8 delve into the comparison of data center
demand response and large-scale storage in more detail for
each of the networks. In Figure 7, we fix the capacity of the
data center to 20MW, which is a representative size for to-
day’s IT companies, and then investigate the impact of the
degree of data center flexibility, e, and the placement of the
data center. For example, Figures 7(a)-7(c) highlight that
the voltage violation rates decrease as data center power de-
mand becomes more flexible. In particular, a 20MW data
center with 20% power demand flexibility placed at the PV
location is equivalent to 0.67MWh of optimally-placed stor-
age in the 47 bus distribution network. Further, Figure 7(d)
shows that the benefit of data center flexibility is robust to
the placement of the network in the distribution network,
i.e., there are very few locations where the effectiveness of
the data center drops considerably and many locations that
are near-optimal, e.g., placing the data center at the location
of the PV (Figure 7(b)). Figure 7(d) also illustrates that a
20MW data center is better than 0.33MWh of storage pretty
much uniformly. The results in a SCE 56 bus network are
similar, as shown in Figure 8.
Should data centers invest in co-located renewables?.
There is a dichotomy right now in how IT companies address
the sustainability of their data centers. Some companies,
e.g., Apple [24], have invested heavily in on-site renewable
generation; while others, e.g., Google [25], have tended to
invest in renewable generation that is not co-located with
their data centers.
Both approaches have merits, as we have discussed in the
introduction. For the purpose of this paper, the key distinc-
tion is how on-site renewable generation impacts data center
demand response. This context highlights another benefit of
on site renewable generation – it ensures that the data cen-
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Figure 6: Diagram of the capacity of storage neces-
sary to achieve the same voltage violation frequency
as data centers of varying sizes. The data center has
flexibility e = 0.2.
ter is placed close to the renewables, which is very often a
near-optimal placement for demand response purposes.
First, Figure 7(d) highlights that co-location of data cen-
ters and large-scale PV installations is very efficient. In
particular, the voltage violation frequency when the data
center is placed as the same bus as the PV in a distribution
network is within 4% of optimal.
However, it is worth noting that a data center with local
PV is not nearly as efficient at helping to manage a large-
scale PV installation as a data center without local PV,
by comparing Figure 7(c) with 9(a). In particular, a 20MW
data center with 20% flexibility and a 5MW solar installation
provides the same voltage violation frequency as 0.3MWh of
optimally-placed storage when helping to manage 30MW of
PV elsewhere on the distribution network, i.e., 25% less than
a data center with the same flexibility but no local PV.
Thus, having PV at the location of the data center is
better than having it elsewhere, due to the complementary
diurnal patterns of each, but a data center without local
renewables is a more valuable resource for grid management
than a data center with local renewables.
3. MARKET CHALLENGES FOR
DATA CENTER DEMAND RESPONSE
The previous section highlights that data centers have the
potential to be as useful as, if not more useful than, storage
for demand response. However, realizing this potential is
challenging. Data centers today tend not to participate in
demand response programs and, if they do, they tend to
participate passively.
For example, the most common program for data cen-
ter demand response today is coincident peak pricing and,
though many data centers are forced to participate, they
typically do not actively respond to the warnings issued by
the utility. Further, even if they did, this would mean that
the data center provided flexibility only 5-10 times a month,
which is far from the amount of available flexibility. Such
limited signaling from the LSE to the data center cannot
possibly extract the potential flexibility illustrated in Sec-
tion 2. On the other hand, if the utility company sends too
many warning signals, data centers simply will not respond
to them.
Thus, realizing the potential of data center demand re-
sponse requires new market programs. While the design of
market programs for data centers is only beginning to receive
attention, there has been considerable work on the design of
demand response programs in other contexts in recent years,
e.g., [2, 9, 16,17,22,29,37,50]. Much of this work focuses on
the design of residential programs for, e.g., electric vehicles,
pool pumps, and air conditioner cycling.
Broadly speaking, the demand response programs that
have emerged can be classified into two categories based on
the interaction with users: either (i) users bid some degree
of flexibility (supply) into the market, usually via a param-
eterized supply function, or (ii) users respond to a posted
price, which was chosen using predictions about the avail-
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Figure 7: Comparison of a 20MW data center to large-scale storage in a 47 bus SCE distribution network.
(a)-(c) show the violation frequency as a function of the amount of data center flexibility, e, and compare to
optimally placed storage, for different locations of the data center. (d) shows the violation frequency resulting
from a data center with e = 0.2 versus 0.33MWh of storage, for each location.
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Figure 8: Comparison of a 4MW data center to
large-scale storage in a 56 bus SCE distribution net-
work. (a) shows the violation frequency as a func-
tion of the amount of data center flexibility, e, and
compare to optimally placed storage. (b) shows the
violation frequency resulting from a data center with
e = 0.2 compared to 0.07MWh of storage at each lo-
cation.
able flexibility (e.g., supply functions). We discuss each of
these approaches below and highlight the challenges of each
when it comes to data center demand response.
Supply function bidding. In this approach to market de-
sign each user announces a bid to the load serving entity
(LSE) that specifies the amount load will be curtailed as a
function of the price, a.k.a., a supply function. The form of
the supply function is typically fixed to have some paramet-
ric form and the bid specifies the parameter. The LSE then
chooses a market clearing price that achieves the demand
response target. Examples of market designs of this form
include [29,50] and the references therein.
Typically, a key assumption in the design and analysis
of such markets is that users are price takers, i.e., they do
not anticipate their impact on the price. Under this assump-
tion, such designs can minimize the aggregate user cost while
achieving the desired curtailment of demand. However, if
this assumption is violated, and users act strategically, then
inefficiency emerges. Recent work has begun to characterize
this inefficiency, and the basic conclusion is that it can be
extreme [50].
While the assumption that users are price takers is natu-
ral in many demand response settings, e.g., residential pool
pump and air conditioner programs; it is quite problematic
in the case of data centers. A residential user does not have
the power to manipulate prices, i.e., does not have market
power, but a large data center can make up 50% of the load
of the distribution circuits they are on, e.g., Facebook’s data
center in Crook County, Oregon. Thus, data centers are a
canonical example of an agent with market power. This
observation motivates the consideration of prediction-based
pricing in the current paper.
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Figure 9: Comparison of a 20MW data center with a
co-located 5MW PV installation to large-scale stor-
age in a 47 bus SCE distribution network. (a) de-
picts the data center located at bus 2. (b) shows
the violation frequency resulting from a data center
with e = 0.2 compared to 0.33MWh of storage, for
each location.
Prediction-based pricing. In this approach to market de-
sign, the LSE presents the user a price that they will pay the
user for curtailment, and then the user responds. Examples
of designs of this type can be found in [12, 32, 40] and the
references therein. The challenge in such a program is how
the LSE should determine the price.
If the LSE knew the supply function of the users, then it
could easily set a price to extract the desired curtailment.
However, the LSE does not have this information, and since
it is not provided by the user (as in the supply function
bidding approach), the LSE must predict the user supply
functions. Then, using the predicted supply functions, the
LSE can determine an appropriate price to induce the de-
sired curtailment.
Clearly, one should expect prediction-based pricing to only
be appropriate if supply functions can be predicted accu-
rately. This is a challenge in the data center environment
since the supply functions of the data center may depend
on the workloads and weather (among other things), each of
which is highly non-stationary.
The key task in the remainder of the paper is to charac-
terize how accurate predictions must be for the prediction-
based pricing approaches to be useful. Interestingly, the
contrast between the performance of prediction-based pric-
ing and supply function bidding depends on the balance be-
tween the market power of data centers and the accuracy of
supply function prediction. We discuss this in Section 4.3
by contrasting our results with those in [50].
4. PREDICTION-BASED PRICING FOR
DATA CENTER DEMAND RESPONSE
In this section, we develop a market program for extract-
ing flexibility from data centers. Given the discussion in
Section 3, our focus is on prediction-based pricing. In par-
ticular, the goal of this section is (i) to optimally design
prediction-based pricing programs for data center demand
response, (ii) to quantify the efficiency loss created by pre-
diction error in such programs, and (iii) to contrast prediction-
based pricing with supply function bidding. We do this in
the context of a classic supply function model in this section,
and then show how to incorporate distribution network con-
straints in Section 5.
4.1 Model formulation
The setting we consider here is where an LSE wishes to
procure a total amount D of load reduction from a set of
users indexed by 1, 2, . . . , n. We focus on one time step and
ignore the network constraints in this section.
To procure this load reduction, the LSE announces a price
p and pays user i the amount psi when user i reduces con-
sumption by si ≥ 0. The market design task is to design p
so that the LSE achieves the desired amount of curtailment.
To model the user reaction to the price, we assume that
each user i incurs a cost Ci(di) when she reduces her con-
sumption by an amount di ≥ 0. We assume some parame-
ter(s) of the cost function Ci(·) are random so that for each
di ≥ 0, Ci(di) is a random variable. This randomness cap-
tures the fact that, in practice, the LSE does not know the
parameter(s) of Ci(·) exactly. However, the LSE may be able
to estimate the parameters from historical consumption data
and the effect of estimation error can be modeled through
the distribution of the random parameter(s) in Ci(·).
We assume that user i strategically reduces her consump-
tion when faced with a price p in a profit maximizing man-
ner. Let si(p) denote the unique cost minimizing curtail-
ment. Specifically, for each realization of Ci(·), denoted by
ci(·), user i solves
min
di≥0
ci(di)− pdi, (1)
which gives
si(p) = c
′−1
i (p). (2)
To ensure that a unique solution si(p) ≥ 0 always exists,
we impose that each realization ci(·) of the random cost
function Ci(·) is non-negative, increasing, strictly convex,
twice continuously differentiable, and has c(0) = 0. Addi-
tionally, note that we have implicitly assumed that the ran-
domness in Ci(di) is independent of the price p. These are
standard assumptions in the electricity market literature,
e.g., [4, 8, 41,51].
Given the model above, the total demand response the
LSE achieves with price p is the random quantity
∑
i si(p).
Given the uncertainty about the user costs, this curtailment
likely does not exactly match the demand response target D.
We assume that the penalty for deviation from the target
is captured through a penalty function h(·). In particular,
the penalty is h
(
D −∑i si(p)). We assume this penalty
function h(·) is convex, non-negative, has a global minimum
h(0) = 0, and is continuously differentiable with h′(0) = 0.
These assumptions ensure that the optimal price is well-
defined, see Theorem 1.
4.2 The efficiency of prediction-based pricing
Given the setting described above, our task is to first un-
derstand how to price, and then to understand the efficiency
loss due to prediction error. We start with the case where
the LSE has perfect predictions of the data center supply
functions, i.e., with perfect foresight. Then, we move to the
case where the LSE has only predictions of the data cen-
ter supply functions. Finally, we quantify the efficiency loss
that results from this uncertainty.
Throughout, to evaluate the efficiency of the LSE’s choice
of p we use a notion of social cost defined as the sum of
the penalty of deviation from the demand response target
D and the total user costs, i.e.,
G(p) := h
(
D −∑i si(p))+∑i Ci(si(p)). (3)
Note that the social cost G(p) is random from the LSE’s per-
spective for two reasons: both Ci(di) and the user responses
si(p) are random. But, the randomness in both of these
originates from the randomness of the user cost functions
Ci(·).
Pricing with perfect foresight. Before looking at the de-
sign of prediction-based pricing, it is informative to consider
how an LSE with perfect foresight would price. In partic-
ular, consider an LSE that is clairvoyant, i.e., has perfect
knowledge about the cost function, and can choose p(ω) to
minimize G(p) for the realization on instance ω. We use ω
here to highlight this price is for each realization ω. In this
situation, the price chosen by the LSE is summarized in the
following theorem.
Theorem 1. For each realization ω, there exists a unique
minimizer p∗ such that
p∗(ω) = h′
(
D −
∑
i
si(p
∗(ω))
)
, (4)
and 0 ≤ p∗ < p, where p satisfies ∑i si(p) = D.
An interesting aspect of this theorem is that the optimal
price is strictly lower than any price p that would exactly
satisfy the demand response target.
Of course, using p∗ in practice is infeasible. However, it
provides an important benchmark for the performance of
prediction-based pricing without perfect foresight. Note p∗
is random from LSE’s perspective, since the cost function
realizations are random. Thus, the strategy yields an ex-
pected cost which we denote as follows
E [G(p∗)] = E
[
min
p≥0
G(p)
]
. (5)
Prediction-based pricing. In practice, the LSE does not
know the exact realization of the user cost function, thus
it can only use predictions of the cost functions in order to
choose a price pˆ. Here, we focus on the case where the LSE
chooses pˆ in order to minimize the expected cost that results,
i.e.,
pˆ ∈ argmin
p≥0
E [G(p)] . (6)
This yields the following
E [G(pˆ)] = min
p≥0
E [G(p)] . (7)
Of course, other objectives that include some form of risk
management may also be interesting to consider in future
work. Note that we assume that users know their own cost
function, and can therefore choose their curtailment amount
si(p) based on the true cost function ci(·) (cf. (2)). This
means the random events that determine the Ci(·) are re-
vealed only to individual users, but not to the LSE (or other
users).
The efficiency of prediction-based pricing. Clearly the
cost when pricing with perfect foresight is no larger than the
cost when using prediction-based pricing. Here, our goal is
to understand how much is lost because of uncertainty about
the cost function.
To quantify this efficiency loss, we study the worst-case
ratio between the cost of prediction-based pricing and the
cost of pricing with perfect foresight. This is a competitive
ratio. In particular, let F be the joint distribution of all
random variables in the model, and F be a set of permissi-
ble distributions. Then the competitive ratio we consider is
formally defined as CR = maxF∈F
E[G(pˆ)]
E[G(p∗)] .
To evaluate the competitive ratio, we need to restrict our-
selves to the quadratic penalty function and cost functions,
i.e.,
h
(
D −
∑
i
si(p)
)
:=
q
2
(
D −
∑
i
si(p)
)2
and (8)
Ci(di) :=
1
2Xi
d2i , (9)
where q > 0 is known, but Xi > 0 are random variables
to the LSE. Note that this may seem restrictive, but this
form is standard within the electricity markets literature,
e.g., [4, 8, 41,51].
Then, for each realization, we can explicitly compute the
curtailments of the users. Specifically, from (2):
si(p) = Xip and Ci(si(p)) =
1
2
Xip
2 (10)
Now, we can state the main theorems of this section, which
bound the competitive ratio of prediction-based pricing in
terms of the variability of prediction errors (Theorem 2) and
show that the bound is tight (Theorem 3). Let X :=
∑
iXi,
denote the variance of X by V [X], and denote the squared
coefficient of variation of X by C2[X] = V[X]/(E[X])2.
Theorem 2. Suppose the penalty function and cost func-
tions are given by (8) and (9), respectively. Then the com-
petitive ratio is upper bounded by
E [G(pˆ)]
E [G(p∗(ω))]
≤ 1 + (qE[X])
2C2[X]
1 + (qE[X])(C2[X] + 1)
. (11)
Moreover pˆ ≤ E [p∗] , with equality if and only if V[X] = 0.
Theorem 3. Under the conditions of Theorem 2 the bound
in (11) is asymptotically tight, i.e., for all  > 0, there exists
a probability density function f(X) such that
E [G(pˆ)]
E [G(p∗(ω))]
≥ 1 + (qE[X])
2C2[X]
1 + (qE[X])(C2[X] + 1)
− .(12)
Before moving on, it is worth making a few remarks about
these theorems.
First, the results apply both when the prediction errors
from users are independent and when they are correlated.
Second, the competitive ratio decreases as the variability
of X decreases. This means that a better prediction can pro-
vide better performance. In the extreme case, when there
is no randomness in X, i.e., perfect foresight, then Theo-
rem 2 guarantees that the competitive ratio is 1. Moreover
pˆ = p∗(ω) and G(pˆ) = G(p∗). In contrast, when there is pre-
diction error, the LSE tends to have lower price to prevent
over provisioning. This is because the attained curtailment∑
i si(p) is an increasing function of the price p. Specifically,
we have
pˆ =
qE [X]D
qE [X2] + E [X]
and p∗ =
qD
qX + 1
, (13)
which both increase with q.
Third, it is interesting to note that the competitive ratio
does not depend on the particular distributional form be-
yond the first and second moments of an aggregated value.
This is due to the quadratic nature of both the user cost
functions Ci(·) and the penalty function h(·). One should
expect that if these functions were polynomials with higher
order then higher order moments would show up in the com-
petitive ratio.
Finally, it is important to consider the impact of the num-
ber of users, n, on the competitive ratio, i.e., on the efficiency
of prediction-based pricing. This does not show up explicitly
in Theorem 2, but it is possible to extract the information
via a slightly more detailed analysis.
Consider a simple case where all Xi are i.i.d. with mean
E [Xi] = α and variance V [Xi] = σ2. Then, the mean and
variance of the random variable X(n) :=
∑n
i=1Xi are given
by:
E [X(n)] = nα and V [X(n)] = nσ2. (14)
As n increases, the central limit theorem guarantees that
X(n)−nα√
nσ
tends to a Gaussian random variable with zero
mean and unit variance. Hence, informally, X(n) tends to a
Gaussian random variable with its mean and variance grow-
ing linearly in n as in (14).
Note, however, that (14) only imposes conditions on the
first two moments of X(n) and does not require X(n) to
be Gaussian nor their distributions to depend on just the
first two moments. To highlight the dependence on n, let
Gn, gn, p
∗(n), pˆ(n), X(n), Xˆ(n) etc. denote the correspond-
ing quantities when there are n users. Then, we can prove
the following corollary of Theorem 2, which shows that the
competitive ratio exceeds 1 by an amount upper bounded
by the normalized variance qσ2/α.
Corollary 4. Suppose the first two moments of X(n) are
given by (14). Under the conditions of Theorem 2, the bound
on the competitive ratio is increasing in n. Moreover
E [Gn(pˆ(n))]
E [Gn (p∗(n))]
≤ 1 + q
2α2
qα3
σ2
+
(
α2
σ2
+ qα
)
/n
→ 1 + qσ
2
α
as n→∞.
Note that the competitive ratio increases as the number
of users increases. That is because the cost h(·) is based
on the sum, not mean, of the users’ elasticities. A system
with a small number of users is identical to a system with a
larger number of users in which some are entirely inelastic,
which has lower uncertainty than the large system in which
all users have random elasticity.
However, the analysis above should be taken with a grain
of salt because, in practice, users are correlated. For exam-
ple, on a hot day, many users will be more reluctant to turn
their cooling systems off. We can illustrate the impact of
such correlations with the following simple model.
Xi = X0 +X
′
i,
where X ′i are i.i.d. and independent of the common random
variable X0. In this case, given  > 0, E[X] = Θ(n), V[X] =
Θ(n2), so C2[X] = Θ(1), and
E [Gn(pˆ(n))]
E [Gn (p∗(n))]
= Θ(n).
This highlights that correlation among users can magnify the
impact of prediction errors compared to the uncorrelated
case, which has a negative impact on the performance of
prediction-based pricing.
Such effects are not too worrying in the case of data cen-
ter demand response, since it is unlikely for there to be a
large number of data centers on any given distribution net-
work. However, we have included the discussion in order to
highlight a danger of using prediction-based pricing in other
demand response contexts.
4.3 Prediction-based pricing versus
supply function bidding
The previous results highlight that if predictions are ac-
curate, then prediction-based pricing can be an effective
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Figure 10: Comparison of prediction-based pricing
and supply function bidding demand response pro-
grams. (a) shows the efficiency loss as a function
of the prediction error with n = 5. (b) shows the
prediction error at which prediction-based pricing
begins to have worse efficiency than supply function
bidding for each n.
market design; however, if predictions are poor the mar-
ket is highly inefficient. We now contrast the efficiency of
prediction-based pricing with the supply function bidding
approach discussed in Section 3.
Recall that previous work has concluded that supply func-
tion bidding is an efficient market design when agents have
limited market power [29, 50]. Thus, which design is ap-
propriate depends on the degree to which participants have
market power and the accuracy of the predictions of supply
functions made by the LSE.
To concretely illustrate the comparison between these two
approaches, we contrast the competitive ratio derived above
with the parallel results in [50]. Formally, Theorem 5.1
in [50] bounds the efficiency loss from strategic behavior of
customers, i.e., price of anarchy (PoA), by 1+ min{Dm,D}−D+∑i6=mDi ,
where Di is the exogenous limit on consumer iO˜s load reduc-
tion and Dm is the largest one, i.e., m ∈ argmax{Di}. This
result is tight when the number of customers is no smaller
than 2. Therefore, if there is only two large customers such
like data centers or one large customer and some small cus-
tomers considered together, then the efficiency loss can be
very high. Generally, the loss decreases when more cus-
tomers enter the market.3
The results of the comparison are shown in Figure 10.
Specifically, Figure 10(a) shows the efficiency loss of both
prediction-based pricing and supply function bidding. The
impact of prediction error (in terms of the standard devi-
ation σ of Xi when fixing E[Xi] = 1) can be seen in the
figure, where we assume the prediction errors of customers
are independent. In particular, the figure highlights that
the efficiency loss increases as the prediction error increase.
When the number of users is small (5 in the figure), and thus
market power is an issue, even with large prediction error
(up to 60%), the prediction-based approach can still provide
better performance than supply function bidding.
Figure 10(b) shows how this changes as the number of
users grows, and thus market power becomes less of an issue.
In particular, the figure shows the standard deviation thresh-
old where prediction-based pricing becomes worse than sup-
ply function biding. Naturally, this threshold decreases as
the number of users increases. However, even with 10 users,
prediction-based pricing tolerates more than 30% prediction
error before providing worse efficiency than supply function
bidding. This emphasizes that prediction-based pricing is an
appealing approach for demand response since it is unlikely
to have more than a few data centers on a given distribution
circuit.
3When this is only one customer, the approach in [50] does
apply. Roughly speaking, in this case, the customer is a
monopoly, so it can force the utility company to pay as much
as possible if meeting the total demand reduction is enforced.
5. INCORPORATING NETWORK
CONSTRAINTS
The previous section introduces prediction-based pricing
in a context without a power network. In that context, the
results highlight that prediction-based pricing is an appeal-
ing approach for data center demand response, since the
efficiency of the mechanism is robust to errors in prediction
as long as there are not a large number of correlated agents.
In this section, our goal is to add an additional degree of
realism to the model, power network constraints, and to in-
vestigate how these constraints impact the performance of
prediction-based pricing.
5.1 Modeling the network
The setting we consider in this section is the same as in
Section 4, except for the addition of network constraints.
Typically, when electricity market issues like demand re-
sponse are considered, the network constraints are either
ignored entirely or a linear approximation, termed the “DC
model,” is used. See [44] for an introduction. However, due
to our focus on reducing voltage violations with data cen-
ter demand response, the DC model is not appropriate; it
assumes the voltages at all buses are fixed at the reference
value, which is seldom true in distribution networks.
As a result, we adopt a different model, called the “branch
flow” model, which is commonly used for modeling distri-
bution systems, e.g., [5, 11]. This model still uses a linear
approximation of the power constraints, but now voltage
variations are allowed at all buses except the root bus.
The branch flow model is defined as follows. The power
network is represented by a directed, connected tree G =
(N,E), where each node in N := {0, 1, ..., n} represent a
bus with the root at bus 0, each edge in E represents a line.
Denote an edge by (i, j) or i → j if it points from bus i to
bus j. The orientation of edges is fixed to be from the root
to the leaves for G.
For each edge (i, j) ∈ E, let zij := rij+ixij be the complex
impedance on the line, and let Sij := Pij + iQij be the
sending-end complex power from bus i to bus j. This is the
same as the receiving end power since lines are assumed to
be lossless.
Let sj = Pj + iQj be the complex net load (load minus
generation) on bus j. Here Pj is the real power consumption,
which can be further written as P 0j − sj(p), where P 0j is the
real power consumption without demand response and sj(p)
is the demand reduction given price p. Under our model,
si(p) = Xip, ∀i. Qj is the reactive power consumption on
bus j and we assume Qj = βjPj , ∀j. The branch flow model
is defined by the following set of power flow equations.
Sij − sj =
∑
k:j→k
Sjk, ∀j, (15)
vi − vj = 2Re(z∗ijSij), ∀i, j, (16)
where Re(·) is the real part of a given complex number. Here
(15) balances the power on each bus, and (16) characterizes
the voltages across line (i, j) according to Ohm’s law.
The constraint for the voltage on each bus is
vi ≤ vi ≤ vi, ∀i. (17)
5.2 Prediction-based pricing in networks
The incorporation of the network has a significant conse-
quence for the design of prediction-based pricing. Due to
the randomness of the cost functions, it is impossible for the
voltage constraints to be always satisfied. This motivates a
chance constraint where the goal of the LSE when setting
price pˆ is now
E [G(pˆ)] = min
p
E [G(p)] (18)
s.t. p ≥ 0
P{voltage violation|p} ≤ .
To determine more concretely what the set of feasible
prices is for the chance constraint above, we first need to
transform the power network constraints into constraints on
feasible prices. To accomplish this, note that (15) gives that
Sij =
∑
k∈Tj sk, where Tj is the tree rooted at bus j (in-
cluding bus j). Then, we can rewrite (16) as
vi − vj = 2Re(z∗ijSij)
= 2Re
(rij − ixij) ∑
k∈Tj
sk

= 2
rij ∑
k∈Tj
Pk + xij
∑
k∈Tj
Qk

= 2
rij ∑
k∈Tj
(
P 0k −Xkp
)
+ xij
∑
k∈Tj
βk
(
P 0k −Xkp
)
= 2
∑
k∈Tj
(rij + xijβk)P
0
k − 2
∑
k∈Tj
(rij + xijβk)Xkp
:= Mij −Nijp.
Note that Mij is a constant here, while Nij is a random
variable due to the uncertainties in Xk.
Next, assuming that Ek is the set of edges from root to
bus k, we have (using v0 = 1)
vk = 1−
∑
(i,j)∈Ek
(Mij −Nijp)
= 1−
∑
(i,j)∈Ek
Mij +
∑
(i,j)∈Ek
Nijp.
Therefore vk ≤ vk ≤ vk becomes
vk ≤ 1−
∑
(i,j)∈Ek
Mij +
∑
(i,j)∈Ek
Nijp ≤ vk,
which further implies
vk − 1 +
∑
(i,j)∈EkMij∑
(i,j)∈Ek Nij
≤ p ≤
vk − 1 +
∑
(i,j)∈EkMij∑
(i,j)∈Ek Nij
.
This condition should hold for all buses, and therefore the
feasible set is
max
k
vk − 1 +
∑
(i,j)∈Ek Mij∑
(i,j)∈Ek Nij
≤ p ≤ min
k
vk − 1 +
∑
(i,j)∈Ek Mij∑
(i,j)∈Ek Nij
. (19)
We can simplify the feasible set further by assuming that
the voltage constraints (17) are satisfied when there is no
demand response, i.e.,
vk ≤ 1−
∑
(i,j)∈Ek
Mij ≤ vk, ∀k. (20)
This implies that the feasible range in (19) is nonempty.
Additionally, since we only consider demand reduction
with p ≥ 0,4 and vk − 1 +
∑
(i,j)∈EkMij ≤ 0, ∀k, and we
4Note that all the results here can be easily extended to the
case where we allow p to be negative.
assume Xk ≥ 0, we can further simplify the feasible set to
p ≤ min
k
vk − 1 +
∑
(i,j)∈EkMij∑
(i,j)∈Ek Nij
. (21)
Again, recall that Nij is random. Therefore, the con-
straint above is on realizations. Importantly, for each re-
alization, the constraints are linear, and therefore we can
translate the constraints into a bound on the fraction of vi-
olation for each bus as follows.
P
 ∑
(i,j)∈Ek
Nijp ≥ vk − 1 +
∑
(i,j)∈Ek
Mij
 ≤ ,∀k. (22)
The above equation can be viewed as a concrete special-
ization of the voltage violation constraint in (18). Note that
it has a number of interesting properties. In particular, the
violation probability is a strictly increasing function of p that
equals 0 when p = 0 and approaches P
{∑
(i,j)∈Ek Nij > 0
}
as p → ∞. Therefore, if P
{∑
(i,j)∈Ek Nij > 0
}
is smaller
than , the chance constraint is satisfied for all p ≥ 05. Oth-
erwise there is a threshold p at which point the violation
probability exceeds . In this case, the feasible pricing space
is [0, p], and the optimizing price becomes the projection
of the unconstrained price derived in Section 4 onto this
interval.
5.3 The efficiency of prediction-based pricing
in networks
The previous analysis highlights that the necessary adjust-
ment in the price used by the LSE due to network constraints
can be achieved via a projection onto a feasible space of
prices, which we have characterized in (22). The goal of this
section is to understand the impact of network constraints,
i.e., the projection into the feasible space of prices, have on
the efficiency of the resulting price.
The main message of what follows is that network ef-
fects do not reduce the efficiency of prediction-based pricing,
when efficiency is measured by the competitive ratio.
In particular, let us compare our algorithm with the clair-
voyant algorithm that uses the same feasible set [0, p] for
each realization. This makes the oﬄine algorithm weaker
than the one considered in Section 4, i.e., the performance
is strictly worse.
Recall that we denote by G(pˆ) and G(p∗(ω)) the cost of
our algorithm and the clairvoyant algorithm in Section 4
where network constraints are not considered. Let us now
denote by G(pˆ) and G(p
∗
 (ω)) the cost of our algorithm and
the clairvoyant algorithm with the same feasible set [0, p],
defined as a function of the network constraints.
Our goal is to compare the competitive ratio without net-
work constraints, i.e., E[G(pˆ)]E[G(p∗(ω))] , to the competitive ratio
under network constraints, i.e., E[G(pˆ)]E[G(p∗ (ω))]
.
The following theorem highlights that constraints on the
pricing space actually reduce the efficiency loss from uncer-
tainty, and so the competitive ratio of prediction-based pric-
ing remains unchanged when network constraints are con-
sidered. In the statement, we consider the feasible price set
R := [p, p] and denote by g(pˆR) and g(p
∗
R) the cost of our
algorithm and the clairvoyant algorithm with the same fea-
sible set for a convex function g(·), e.g., a realization of the
random function G(·). Proof is given in the appendix.
Theorem 5. Consider any positive, convex function g(·)
that is a realization of the random function G(·) and any
5This does not happen in our case because we assume Xi’s
are positive, therefore P
{∑
(i,j)∈Ek Nij > 0
}
= 1
non-empty feasible set R := [p, p]. Then,
g(pˆ)
g(p∗)
≥ g(pˆR)
g(p∗R)
, (23)
and thus
E [G(pˆ)]
E [G(p∗(ω))]
≥ E [G(pˆ)]
E [G(p∗ (ω))]
. (24)
A key distinction between this theorem and Theorem 2
is that the feasible price set of both the optimal and the
algorithm are fixed to R := [p, p]. This implies that we
are not comparing with the “true” oﬄine optimal, which
may have different feasible sets for the price for different
realizations. Instead, we are comparing with the weaker
oﬄine optimal that, because of uncertainty, optimizes over
the same feasible price set as our online algorithm, but then
has the foresight necessary to choose optimally given these
price constraints. This is a common choice for comparison
when studying the competitive ratio of online algorithms in
situations where clairvoyance yields different feasible action
spaces.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have highlighted two main points. First,
that data center demand response has significant potential
and, second, that prediction-based pricing is an appealing
mechanism with which to extract this potential.
More concretely, we have illustrated that, not only are
data centers large loads to target with demand response pro-
grams, they can provide nearly the same degree of flexibility
for LSEs as large-scale storage if properly incentivized. How-
ever, this last caveat is crucial – it is much harder to extract
flexibility from data centers than from storage.
To that end, this paper has argued that prediction-based
pricing is a promising market design for this context. While,
in general, prediction-based pricing may be less efficient
than supply function bidding (due to prediction errors), be-
cause data centers typically have significant market power
on their distribution networks, supply function bidding can
be very inefficient whereas prediction-based pricing is less
influenced.
In particular, the analytic results in Sections 4 and 5 high-
light that the efficiency of prediction-based pricing is favor-
able to that of supply function bidding when market power
is an issue – even when predictions are error prone. These
analytic results are the first, to our knowledge, that provide
bounds on the competitive ratio of prediction-based pric-
ing programs, and also the first to provide an analysis of
prediction-based pricing programs in a context where net-
work constraints are considered.
However, much work still remains before prediction-based
pricing can be used in practice. In particular, in this paper
we have adopted quadratic objectives, and it is important
to understand the impact of this. For example, in the con-
text of internet congestion management, [36] has studied the
impact of convexity of costs on the contrast between time-of-
use pricing and fixed-budget rebates. A similar study in the
context of predictive pricing and supply function bidding is
crucial.
Further, it is important to do an empirical study to un-
derstand how predictable the response of data centers will
be in demand response programs. Initial pilot studies along
these lines are proceeding in some demand response mar-
kets, but these have yet to focus on data centers specifically.
Depending on the result of such studies, it may be natu-
ral to consider hybrid mechanisms that combine predictions
and bidding in order to extract supply function information
from data centers.
Additionally, many practical aspects of prediction-based
pricing programs still require careful thought. For example,
what is the appropriate time-scale at which prices should be
adjusted? The time-scale chosen allows for a balance be-
tween the responsiveness desired by the LSE and the risk-
aversion of the data center. Further, in this paper we have
assumed a scalar price. One could also investigate location
dependent prices in distribution networks, similar to loca-
tional marginal prices (LMPs) for transmission networks.
While these are not currently used, the extra geographical
flexibility they provide could be valuable. Finally, there are
interesting exploration-exploitation tradeoffs that come up
when setting prices in prediction-based pricing programs.
We have not addressed this issue in this paper due to the
complexities of the power network, but work in the opera-
tions research community has begun to study this in other
contexts [6, 7], using “regret” as the performance measure.
It would be interesting for future work to incorporate this
issue into the demand response context.
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APPENDIX
A. APPENDIX: PROOFS
Proof of Theorem 1
To begin, we compute as follows:
g′(p) = −h′
(
D −
∑
i
si(p)
)∑
i
s′i(p) +
∑
i
c′i(si(p))s
′
i(p)
=
∑
i
s′i(p)
(
c′i(si(p))− h′
(
D −
∑
i
si(p)
))
=
(
p− h′
(
D −
∑
i
si(p)
)) ∑
i
s′i(p),
where the last equality follows from c′i(si(p)) = p for all i.
Our assumptions imply that s′i(p) = (c
′′
i (si(p)))
−1
> 0, and
hence g′(p) = 0 if and only if
v(p) := p− h′
(
D −
∑
i
si(p)
)
= 0.
Now, v(0) = −h′(D) ≤ 0, v(p) = p > 0, and v(p) is strictly
increasing. Hence a unique 0 ≤ p∗ < p satisfies v(p∗) = 0.
Moreover g′(p) < 0 for p < p∗ and g′(p) > 0 for p > p∗
implying that p∗ is the unique minimizer of g(p).
Proof of Theorem 2
We first evaluate E [G(p∗)]. From Theorem 1
p∗ = h′
(
D −
∑
i
si(p
∗)
)
= q
(
D − p∗
∑
i
Xi
)
= qD − qXp∗.
Hence
p∗ =
q
1 + qX
D, (25)
which is a random (optimal) price.
Next, from (10) and (25) we have
E [G(p∗)] = qD
2
2
E
[
1
1 + qX
]
, (26)
where the expectation is taken over X.
To evaluate (7) we have, using (10),
E [G(pˆ)] = min
p≥0
E
[
q
2
(D −Xp)2 + 1
2
Xp2
]
= min
p≥0
1
2
((
qE
[
X2
]
+ E [X]
)
p2 − 2qDE [X] p+ qD2) .
Consequently, the unique minimizer pˆ and the optimal
value of (7) are
pˆ =
qE [X]
qE [X2] + E [X]
D, (27)
E [G(pˆ)] = qD
2
2
E [X] + qV [X]
E [X] + qE [X2]
. (28)
We can now quantify the competitive ratio using (26) and
(18). Jensen’s inequality implies E [G(p∗)] ≥ qD2
2
1
1+qE[X] .
Thus,
E [G(pˆ)]
E [G(p∗)]
≤ E [X] + qV [X]
E [X] + qE [X2]
(1 + qE [X])
= 1 +
q2E [X]
E [X] + qE [X2]
V [X] .
Rewriting the above in terms of the square coefficient of
variation C2[X] gives:
E [G(pˆ)]
E [G(p∗)]
≤ 1 + (qE[X])
2C2[X]
1 + (qE[X])(C2[X] + 1)
.
Finally, to compare pˆ in (27) with p∗ in (25) we can rewrite
pˆ as
pˆ =
qD
1 + qE[X](C2[X] + 1)
.
Hence
E [p∗] = E
[
qD
1 + qX
]
≥ qD
1 + qE [X]
≥ qD
1 + qE[X](C2[X] + 1)
= pˆ,
where the first inequality follows from the Jensen’s inequal-
ity and the second inequality follows from C2[X] ≥ 0. Both
of these are equalities if and only if X has zero variance.
Proof of Theorem 3
To show tightness we focus on the only inequality used in
the proof of Theorem 2, which is
E [G(p∗)] ≥ qD
2
2(1 + E [X])
.
We need to show that, for any  > 0, there exists a proba-
bility distribution f(X) with mean E [X] and variance V [X]
such that
E [G(p∗)] ≤ qD
2
2(1 + E [X])
+ .
We define such a probability distribution as follows. For
any 0 < x < 1, let d1 := E [X] −
√
V [X] (1− x)/x and
d2 := E [X] +
√
V [X]x/(1− x). Then define the following
probability density function:
fx(X) = xδ(E [X]− d1) + (1− x)δ(E [X]− d2), (29)
where
δ(a) :=
{ ∞ if a = 0
0 otherwise
and
´
δ(a)da = 1.
Note that for any 0 < x < 1, the probability distribution
defined in (29) has mean E [X] and variance V [X] and
lim
x→1
E [G(p∗)] = qD
2
2(1 + E [X])
.
Thus, the bound is tight.
Proof of Corollary 4
Given E [X(n)] = nα and V [X(n)] = nσ2, we have C2[X] =
σ2
nα2
. Thus, we can compute as follows.
E [G(pˆ)]
E [G(p∗)]
≤ 1 + (qE[X])
2C2[X]
1 + (qE[X])(C2[X] + 1)
= 1 +
q2n2α2 σ
2
nα2
1 + qnα
(
σ2
nα2
+ 1
)
= 1 +
q2α2
qα3
σ2
+
(
α2
σ2
+ qα
)
/n
→ 1 + qσ
2
α
as n→∞.
Proof of Theorem 5
To prove that the competitive ratio of prediction-based pric-
ing does not become larger when there are constraints on the
space of prices, i.e., p ∈ [p, p], we consider two cases. The
cases are diagramed in Figure 11.
Case 1 Case 2 
Figure 11: Diagram of cases for proof of Theorem 5.
Case 1: The price p∗ picked by the clairvoyant algorithm
is within the feasible set [p, p], i.e., p∗ ∈ [p, p]. We have
p∗R = p
∗ and therefore g(p∗R) = g(p
∗). If the price picked by
our algorithm pˆ ∈ [p, p], then we have pˆR = pˆ and therefore
g(pˆR) = g(pˆ). Hence
g(pˆ)
g(p∗) =
g(pˆR)
g(p∗
R
)
.
Otherwise pˆ /∈ [p, p]. We have pˆR = p if pˆ < p and pˆR = p
if pˆ > p. In either case g(pˆR) ≤ g(pˆ), and therefore g(pˆ)g(p∗) ≥
g(pˆR)
g(p∗
R
)
.
Case 2: The price p∗ picked by th clairvoyant algorithm
is outside the feasible set [p, p]. Without loss of generality,
we assume p∗ < p, as shown in the figure. We have p∗R = p
and g(p∗R) ≥ g(p∗). If the price picked by our algorithm
pˆ ∈ [p, p], then we have pˆR = pˆ and therefore g(pˆR) = g(pˆ).
Hence g(pˆ)
g(p∗) ≥ g(pˆR)g(p∗
R
)
.
Otherwise pˆ /∈ [p, p]. We have pˆR = p if pˆ < p and pˆR = p
if pˆ > p. In the first case we have pˆR = p
∗
R = p and therefore
g(pˆR) = g(p
∗
R), hence
g(pˆ)
g(p∗) ≥ g(pˆR)g(p∗
R
)
= 1. In the second case
we have g(pˆR) ≤ g(pˆ), and therefore g(pˆ)g(p∗) ≥ g(pˆR)g(p∗
R
)
.
